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W
hen the Russian government defaulted on its
debts to bondholders on Aug. 17, 1998, few
could have predicted that the chain of events
it sparked would culminate a little over a month later in
an unprecedented meeting of the heads of the major Wall
Street financing houses in the boardroom at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. The point of that meeting was
to find a way to save a particular hedge fund by the name
of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM). The company
had suffered substantial losses the past month. If the firm
crumbled, the companies run by all those around the con-
ference table at the New York Fed would see big losses
related to their investments in and loans made to LTCM. 
At the heart of the New York Fed’s involvement in facili-
tating the meeting was a concern about the systemic
ramifications the failure of a firm like LTCM would have on
financial markets. Its involvement was seen largely as mak-
ing explicit a sometimes implicit notion that some firms are
simply too big — or too interconnected with others — to be
allowed to fail. Some argue that the Fed’s actions in this 
case have changed the financial world’s assumptions about
risk-taking. 
Sucking Up Nickels
Started in 1993 by former Salomon Brothers bond trader,
John Meriwether, Long-Term Capital Management was a
hedge fund based on a simple premise. The analysts at the
firm would look for bonds that had a predictable spread
between their yields over a specific time period. Whenever
the observed spread would widen, the LTCM traders 
operated under the assumption that it would eventually 
narrow again. So they would invest in derivative contracts 
that paid off when the spreads narrowed. This is the classic
model of “arbitrage.”
One element in the LTCM approach was that the firm
used complex mathematical models to find connections
between yields of a variety of different bonds. Whereas the
traditional arbitrage opportunities occurred in markets of
fairly conventional bonds, the LTCM analysts cast a broad
net and looked for all sorts of correlations between yields in
various markets. The firm capitalized on advances in data
mining technology and a greater sophistication of the
finance models on which their internal analysis was based.  
Another characteristic was that the firm had as two of its
partners Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, both of whom
would in 1997 win the Nobel Prize in Economics for their
contributions to financial economics. The approach LTCM
used was based on their economic models. At the firm’s
inception, the star power of both Scholes and Merton —
already well-known in their field — was an attractive entice-
ment to potential investors in LTCM. It and Meriwether’s
reputation from his days at Salomon Brothers helped 
attract $1.25 billion in startup capital by the time the firm
began its trading operation in 1994. Investors included
Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, and Merrill Lynch. The LTCM
partners also kicked in a total of $100 million of their 
own money.
The final element of the firm’s strategy was leverage. 
The business of arbitrage assumes there are small 
marginal differences between prices that can be exploited.
Such an investment strategy might be described, as Scholes
is said to have suggested, as “sucking up nickels from all over
the world.” But if the spread between yields is so small, so
are the payouts on investments based on those spreads.
Thus, to make it worthwhile to place the bets LTCM did,
the bets themselves had to be large. That meant the firm
would borrow large sums, using the derivative contracts as
collateral. Leveraging like this was a common practice on
Wall Street, and the assumption was that the bets would 
pay off eventually and the loans could be paid back. 
In the case of LTCM, the bets usually did pay off, and quite
well. As the W all Street Journalreported, “the fund’s returns hit
42.8 percent in 1995, then 40.8 percent in 1996, after fees. 
That far outpaced hedge funds’ average performance of 16
percent and 17 percent, respectively.” By the middle of 1996,
the partners had tripled their original investment.
AShock to the System
Starting in 1997, LTCM began to lose steam. Part of the 
reason was that the bond markets they traded in became too
crowded — many investors were trying the sort of thing that
LTCM did. The profits were getting smaller as a result, and
the firm’s computer models were finding fewer arbitrage
opportunities. That year, the firm’s return dropped to a
more conventional 17 percent after fees.
At this point, LTCM still had $7 billion in capital. But
then the investment philosophy had begun to change.
LTCM began trading emerging-market debt and also started
speculating in foreign currencies.
Some of the partners, most notably Scholes, were uneasy
about this. When the firm took a big stake in the future of
the Norwegian kroner, Scholes warned that the firm didn’t
have an “informational advantage” in that market and it
should stick to what the firm’s models could handle well.
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 Soon, murmurs of unease in foreign bond markets didn’t
bode well for the firm. In June 1998, LTCM racked up a 
10 percent loss, their largest one-month loss to date.
Then came the biggest shock of all. On Monday, August
17, the Russian government defaulted on its debt and let its
currency plummet. This triggered a flight to more stable
assets, like U.S. Treasury bonds. This created problems for
LTCM’s balance sheet, and not just because the fund held a
large number of Russian bonds outright. The events also
threw off the well-defined and predictable pattern of 
interest rate spreads upon which the firm’s derivative 
investments in domestic and foreign bonds relied. 
Now, instead of interest rates converging, the massive rush
to more secure bonds — an anomalous occurrence in the
assumptions of LTCM models — were driving the rates 
further apart.
As the week wore on, things got worse. As Roger
Lowenstein, author of When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of
Long-Term Capital Management, described it: “Long-Term,
which had calculated with such mathematical certainty that
it was unlikely to lose more than $35 million on any single
day, had just dropped $553 million — 15 percent of its capital
— on that one Friday in August. It had started the year with
$4.67 billion. Suddenly, it was down to $2.9 billion. Since the
end of April, it had lost more than a third of its equity.” 
The firm’s partners scrambled for more capital. One of
the partners, Eric Rosenfeld, made an overture to Warren
Buffett with a request for the Berkshire Hathaway CEO to
invest in LTCM. He was initially rebuffed. Buffett, although
intrigued, thought the firm would be better served by having
a Wall Street securities firm bolster its balance sheet.
Such insight was not lost on the partners. In fact, they
had already begun to redouble their efforts to get more Wall
Street investment, but they weren’t getting much in the way
of positive responses. Large institutional investors like
Merrill Lynch declined to invest more in the fund.
Meanwhile, the firm’s lenders were becoming uneasy, under-
standably worried about LTCM’s ability to repay its loans. 
Meriwether still believed that their trades would pay off
if they could simply weather the storm. The nature of most
of their trades, after all, required a long-term view. But 
the lack of cash on hand coupled with the increasing 
buzz that creditors were beginning to consider LTCM 
a default risk created an environment where the partners
were willing to do almost anything to get help. 
By September 17, Meriwether had worked out a deal 
with Goldman Sachs co-chairman, Jon Corzine, that
Goldman would lead an investment group to raise at least 
$2 billion in capital. The next day, Corzine (now a U.S.
Senator from New Jersey) called the president of the New
York Fed, William McDonough, and told him that LTCM
was “weak,” but Goldman was trying to help them re-capi-
talize. To make sure that McDonough had a pair of eyes on
the situation, he called Peter Fisher, the head of the New
York Fed’s trading desk that handled the bond sales which
carry out the Fed’s monetary policy. Fisher was dispatched to
Greenwich, Conn., where LTCM was headquartered to take
a look at the firm’s books on September 20. 
When the fundraising push began, however, Corzine 
discovered that LTCM had already been rebuffed by the
same people that Goldman planned to approach for funding.
Then Corzine decided to call the New York Fed again to let
them know that a new plan had to be hatched quickly and
that the Fed needed to help.
The Rescue  
The scenario that scared the New York Fed policymakers
went like this: LTCM, in its weakened state, would even-
tually have to succumb to demands by fearful lenders for
increased collateral, which could then spur a default by the
hedge fund and set off not only fire-sale panic selling of any
derivative contracts with LTCM’s name attached but also
heavy losses for firms that had made similar investments.
Add to the mix the crater that would open up in the balance
sheets of LTCM’s creditors, and Fed officials believed that
the larger financial system could be at risk.
After his trip to Connecticut, Fisher and McDonough 
decided to work with the big institutional investors in
LTCM — Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Morgan —
to find a way to save LTCM. On the morning of September
22, the lead representatives from these firms met at the New
York Fed. By later that day, the group had determined that
the firms present would be the lead members in an invest-
ment consortium to keep LTCM afloat.
At about 8 p.m., Fisher convened a meeting of the heads
of the original trio and other big Wall Street firms — includ-
ing Chase Manhattan, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter, and Salomon Smith Barney. Press reports later
suggested that Fisher did not hint explicitly at using public
money to help LTCM. Instead, he observed that a collapse
of the hedge fund would be too chaotic for the markets to
handle and suggested that there was “a public interest in a
collective industry option” to keep LTCM from collapsing.
The plan was to ask each firm present to chip in and save 
the hedge fund in exchange for an ownership stake and 
oversight of operations. After discussing details, the meeting
adjourned until the following morning. 
But when the meeting participants arrived the next
morning, McDonough abruptly suspended the meeting.
That morning, Warren Buffett had faxed an offer to
Meriwether stating that he, in partnership with insurance
giant AIG and Goldman Sachs, would be willing to buy
LTCM for $250 million. If the partners of LTCM agreed 
to the deal by 12:30 p.m. that day, Berkshire Hathaway 
would immediately invest $3 billion to stabilize the fund.
Another $750 million would come from the other two firms.
In addition, Buffett’s offer noted that new leadership would 
be installed at LTCM once the buyout had occurred. 
When Buffett’s representatives met Meriwether in
Connecticut before the deadline, Meriwether turned down
the offer. Some observers note that he likely did it because
he knew he could get a better deal from the Fed-facilitated
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structure of LTCM and the way the Buffett offer was 
worded. Yet, as Lowenstein notes, the legal niceties of deals
like that are often worked out after the fact. If Meriwether
wanted to accept the Buffett deal, he probably could have.
In any case, the attention of everyone involved was again
focused on the conference room at the New York Fed. By
5:15 p.m., a deal had been worked out in which most of the
participants at the meeting agreed to pitch in to purchase
the firm for $3.65 billion. The 14-member group would 
collectively receive a 90 percent equity stake in the firm.
The LTCM partners would get the remaining 10 percent,
worth about $400 million. LTCM agreed to the offer and
the legal matters were settled in the weeks following.
The Aftermath
The day after the deal was announced, the press focused
mainly on the Fed’s role in the proceedings. The New 
York Times suggested that the Fed had inappropriately
stretched the doctrine of “too big to fail” to apply to a high-
risk hedge fund. 
The assumption that there was a systemic risk present 
in a potential LTCM default is as controversial a notion
today as it was then. In congressional testimony on the
LTCM affair in October 1998, Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan defended the New York Fed’s actions 
this way: “The issue was in all of our judgments that the
probability [of systemic collapse] was sufficiently large 
to make us very uncomfortable about doing nothing.” 
When questioned about where he would place that proba-
bility, Greenspan responded: “My own guess is that the
probability was significantly below 50 percent, but still large
enough to be worrisome.” 
Roger Lowenstein reports in his history of LTCM 
that Fisher and McDonough were both aware that estimates
of $3 billion to $5 billion in losses would have been 
spread over about 17 banks. That would have been up to
$300 million per firm. In a worldwide capital market of
many trillions of dollars, even they agreed it would have
been tolerable.
The main concern was that the losses would instill fear 
in the markets and that would create a system-wide panic. 
The assumption here is that market participants would not
have been able to determine which institutions were most
heavily invested in LTCM and which were not. That opacity
could have contributed greatly to the systemic uncertainty
which was feared. 
The fear of uncertainty, in retrospect, may not have been
on such solid ground. Analysis by Bong-Chan Kho of Seoul
National University, Dong Lee of Korea University Business
School, and René Stulz of Ohio State University sheds some
light on the state of market information about individual
firm exposures. They looked at the response of bank stocks
during the LTCM crisis. For four of the banks that attended
the meeting at the New York Fed, they found significantly
negative returns on the days surrounding the announce-
ments of LTCM’s losses in early September. That contrasts
with positive returns for banks not exposed to LTCM
investments. They conclude that there is “no basis for 
concerns that markets react similarly across banks and 
that banks have to be protected from the markets. Our 
evidence raises important questions, especially for those
who emphasize the importance of U.S. systemic risks as a
motivation for bailouts.”
Another criticism suggests that the Fed already had more
traditional policy tools at its disposal. Instead of seeking to
broker a deal between private parties to keep LTCM afloat,
it could have instead remained detached from any specific
resolution and stood ready to open the discount window to
any depository institutions that may have been affected by
the events. 
The biggest policy question, however, should be focused
on how the Fed’s actions influenced the assumptions of 
the market. Some argue that the Fed’s response in this 
event sent a strong signal that it was much less likely to tol-
erate the failure of a firm which might result in widespread 
losses and have potentially large systemic implications. 
That expectation — the too big to fail assumption — brings
with it social costs. It encourages behavior that might not
otherwise occur except for the presence of an implicit Fed
guarantee to backstop a firm plagued by bad investments.
Some argue that the recent troubles with large and 
highly leveraged investment houses are a direct result of the
idea that Wall Street generally assumed the Fed wouldn’t let
a large firm fail. Whether that is the main legacy of the Fed’s
role in the LTCM story — and whether it should be an
approach to be emulated or avoided in the future — is a
debate that will continue for quite some time. RF
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